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Collier: Restricting Sexual Conduct

PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF
AIDS BY RESTRICTING SEXUAL
CONDUCT IN GAY BATHHOUSES:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the late Spring of 1981, the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) in Atlanta received reports of clusters of two rare diseases, Kaposi's sarcoma (KS) and Pneumocistis carinii pneumonia (PCP).l All the cases reported to the CDC were linked by a
characteristic immunodeficiency.2 These were the first reported
cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, commonly
called "AIDS."
AIDS is a deadly diseases with no known cause or cure." It
can only be characterized by its expression, diseases which have
as their necessary precondition an underlying immunodeficiency
which cannot otherwise be explained. Ii
1. Selik. Haverkos and Curran. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
Trends in the U.S., 1978-1982, 76 AM. J. MED. 394 (1984). The first cases reported were
of PCP in four homosexual men in Los Angeles. Shortly thereafter, 26 cases of KS were
reported from New York. San Francisco. and Los Angeles.
2. Id. Immunodeficiency is a deficiency in the body's immune system.
3. Forty per cent of those stricken with the disease have died. Landesman and
Vieira. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): A Review. 143 ARCH. INTERNAL
MED. 2307 (1983). Because the number of cases reported per quarter year increases.
Selik, Haverkos. and Curran. supra. note 1. at 495, and the length of time from diagnosis
to death is anywhere from days to years. the mortality rate for those diagnosed in previous years is higher. The two year mortality rate (those who have been diagnosed for two
or more years) is in excess of 70%, Landesman and Vieira. supra. at 2307. "However.
when one breaks down the mortality rate according to the year of diagnosis. the ultimate
mortality may well approach 100%," Fauci. Macher. Longo. Lane. Rook. Masur and
Gelman. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome; Epidemiologic. Clinical. Immunologic
and Therapeutic Considerations. 100 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 92. 94 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Fauci.),
4. "The etiology of' AIDS is unknown." Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3. at
2307. Treatment is limited to the diseases which arise out of the immunodepression. but
not the basic immune defect. Id. at 2308.
5. "The CDC defines a case of AIDS as a patient with a reliably diagnosed disease
that is at least moderately indicative of an underlying cellular immunodeficiency when
no known cause or reduced resistence to that disease is present." Selik, Haverkos. and
Curran. supra note 1. at 493. Typical of the diseases indicative of AIDS are
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No patient has successfully regained immunocompetence
(been cured) through treatment. s Therefore treatment has been
mainly supportive, directed at controling the secondary infections and malignancies. 7
The geographical, social and ethnic clustering of cases suggests that AIDS is caused by a transmissible agent, most likely a
virus. 8 It is generally believed that the viral agent suppresses the
Cryptosporidiosis: an intestinal infection causing diarrhea for more than one month;
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia; strongyloidosis: causing pneumonia or central nervous
system infection; Toxoplasmosis: causing pneumonia or central nervous system infection;
Candidiasis: causing esophagitis (infiamation of the esophagus); Cryptococcosis: causing
central nervous system or disseminated (scattered) infection; "atypical" mycobacteriosis:
causing disseminated infection; cytomegolovirus: causing pulmonary, gastrointestinal
tract, or central nervous system infection; herpes simplex virus: causing chronic infection
on the skin or mucous membrane with ulcers persisting for more than one month, or
pulmonary, gastrointestinal tract or disseminated infection; progressive multifocal
leukoencephalopathy: a fatal disease destroying the cerebral hemispheres of the brain;
Kaposi's Sarcoma: a rare form of malignant skin cancer; and lyphoma limited to the
brain: an unusual anatomic localization for cancer of the lymph nodes. Id. at 499.
6. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307.
7. Fauci, supra note 3, at 101.
8. In patients with AIDS the T-cells (a type of white blood cell) of the lymph system are reduced in number and function. These T-cells protect the body against infection from viruses, protozoa, fungi, and microbial agents. When T-cell dysfunction occurs
due to AIDS, the body succumbs to these infectious agents. Ammann, Dristy, Volberding, et al., The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (A1DS)-A Multidiciplinary
Enigma, 140 W.J. MED. 66-67 (1984). Three viruses (or possibly variants of the same
virus) have been identified as candidate AIDS agents. Human T-cell Leukemia virus
Type III (HTLV-III) was isolated from the T-lymphocytes of AIDS patients by Dr. Gallo
of the National Institute of Health. Types I and II have been found to cause immune
impairment and a rare T-cell leukemia. Dr. Montagnier, at the Pasteur Institute in
France, has isolated a virus from the lymphocytes of a patient with lymphadenopathy
(sometimes referred to as "pre-AIDS"). This virus appears to be different than the one
isolated by Gallo. Fauci, supra note 3, at 104. Dr. Jay Levy has independently isolated a
virus from the T -cells of a patient suffering from lymphadenopathy which he calls AIDS
Related Virus (ARV). S.F. Chron., Aug. 17, 1984, at 4, col. 1; Bay Area Reporter, Aug. 16,
1984, at 1, col. 3.
Lymphadenopathy ("pre-AIDS"), a disease of the lymph nodes, has been suggested
as a prodrome (precursor) to classic AIDS. It has been defined by the CDC as a chronic,
unexplained lymphadenopathy in gay men of at least 3 months duration involving 2 or
more extrainguinal (outside the groin) sites absent any current illness or drug use known
to cause lymphadenopathy; and the presence of reactive hyperplasia (abnormal increase
in the number of cells in normal tissue) in a biopsy. CDC, Persistent, Generalized
Lymphadenopathy Among Homosexual Males, 31 MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY WEEKLY
REP. 249, 249 (1982). Although the relationship between lymphadenopathy in gay men
and AIDS is unclear, its temporal relationship as a precursor and the substantial number
of lymphadenopathy patients who eventually develop AIDS, suggests it is a prodrome of
AIDS.
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normal function of the body's immune system. 9
Since the first reported outbreak in 1981, AIDS has spread
in epidemic fashion. As of November 9, 1984, the Centers for
Disease Control has received reports of 6,931 cases in the United
States. lo The disease has spread throughout the U.S. at a logarithmic rate. 935 cases were reported in 1982, and 1,924 cases
were reported in 1983. As of March, 1984, five new cases were
being reported to the CDC each day.ll Presently the number of
cases doubles every six months. 12 Of the cases reported, 70% are
in homosexual and bisexual men, 18 % in intravenous drug users,
4 % in Haitians, 1 % in hemophiliacs, and 7 % in other groups.18
It is theorized that the causal agent of AIDS is transmitted
via contact with the blood or mucus membranes of a carrier. I.
Close mucosal contact allows the carrier's blood to come in contact with the blood of the receiver, by which the agent is transferred. Such mucosal contact typically occurs during anal and
oral sexual intercourse among homosexual males. This theory
explains why homosexual males are in a high risk category. Direct blood transfer may account for the prevalence of the disease
among intravenous drug users/II and hemophiliacs. 16 Present
patterns of transmission suggest that AIDS will remain largely
confined to the groups already affected. 17
9. Fauci, supra note 3, at 101.
10. Telephone interview with Michael Serban, Associate, John Artman and Associates (Dec. 12, 1984) (public relations contractor with the City of San Francisco Public
Health Department).
11. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307.
12. As of June, 1984, there were 4,761 cases of AIDS nationwide reported to the
CDC. Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing Over AIDS, 6 NAT'L L.J. 44 (July 9, 1984).
13. Selik, Haverkos and Curran, supra note 1, at 499. Of the 7% reported in other
groups, 0.9% of those persons had heterosexual intercourse with a person in one of the
four principal risk groups, and 1.5% in persons who had received a blood transfusion
within five years before the onset of AIDS.
14. La Rocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697 (N.Y. 1983). (Testimony of Dr. Hanrahan, internal medicine specialist and epidemiologist at CDC). There is no evidence that
transmission by casual contact is possible. Fauci, supra note 3, at 93.
15. Intravenous drug users presumably transmit the disease by use of contaminated
needles. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307.
16. Gottlieb, Schroff and Schanker, Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal
Candidiasis in Previously Healthy Homosexual Men, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1430 (Dec.
10, 1981); Seigal, Lopez and Hammer, Severe Acquired Immunodeficiency in Male
Homosexuals Manifested by Chronic Perinatal Ulcerative Herpes simplex lesions, 305
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1439 (Dec. 10, 1981).
17. Researchers expect only minor intrusions into other populations, possibly
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It appears that more people have been exposed to the agent
than have developed the syndrome. I8 Therefore, it is possible
that a significant number of persons have developed immunity.I9

The probability of a person in a high risk category contracting AIDS is not known. 20 The San Francisco Department of
Public Health, in conjunction with the CDC, made a study of
the risk factors for AIDS in a sample of 50 homosexual and bisexual men with AIDS and 120 matched healthy homosexual
controls.21 The study revealed that among the major risk factors
in the cases was a history of multiple and repeated infections
with classic and parasitic sexually-transmitted diseases, and a
history of multiple and diverse sexual encounters.22 There was a
significant preponderance of syphillis, non-B Hepatitis and
acute amebiasis 23 in the histories of those with AIDS. Among the
most significant findings was the promiscuity of the stricken patients. While the control group averaged a mean of 25 different
sexual partners in the year prior to the study, the men with
AIDS averaged a mean of 65 different sexual partners in the
year prior to their diagnosis as carriers. Fifty percent or more of
their partners were encountered in the anonymous setting of gay
bathhouses.24
The rate of progression of the syndrome spans a broad continuum. At one extreme is a fulminating illness where the patient rapidly succumbs to opportunistic infection within hours or
through a blood transfusion, Fauci, supra note 3, at 92; or sexual intercourse between
gay or bisexual men and heterosexual women, S.F. Chron., Dec. 6, 1984, at I, col. 4.
18. A 1984 study by Dr. Connant at the University of California in San Francisco
found antibodies to AIDS Related Virus (ARV) in 64% of the gay men tested in a random sample. See supra note 7. Antibodies were found in the blood of all the AIDS patients and 92% of their sexual partners. No antibodies were found in the blood of heterosexuals not in the other high risk categories. S. F. Chron., Aug. 17, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
19. Fauci, supra note 3, at 94.
20. Kalish, Goldsmith, Green, Hsu, and Phair, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in a Patient with Multiple Risk Factors, 143 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 2311 (Dec.
1983). Neither is the probability of contracting AIDS known for persons with multiple
risk factors.
21. Jaffe, Choi, and Thomas et al., National Case Control Study of Kaposi's sarcoma and Pneumocystis carinii in Homosexual Males, Part I and II, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 145 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe).
22. Ammann, supra note 8, at 69 (citing Jaffe, supra note 21, at 149).
23. Acute amebiasis is severe amoeLic infection, often of the intestine, forming
ulcers.
24. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 149.
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days of the onset of the illness. At the other extreme, the patient
may suffer from a prodrome such as lymphadenopathy,2Ii lasting
weeks to months prior to the onset of classic AIDS. This form of
"pre-AIDS" may result in fevers, substantial weight loss, malaise, and diarrhea. 26 Midrange in the spectrum are patients who
develop lesions of KS or other malignant neoplasms,27 with the
subsequent spread or complication of the malignancy by superimposed opportunistic infections. Most patients ultimately succumb to overwhelming infection.28
Classic AIDS has a substantial debilitating effect on the patient. One man's experience is illustrative:
For the first time in my life. . . I found myself bedridden with a cold that wouldn't go away,
viral bronchitis, fever, diarrhea, loss of appetite,
and extreme fatigue. These problems persisted for
several months and were coupled with the discovery of swollen lymph nodes. . . . Then I developed chronic ear infections, shingles on the backs
of both legs and a persistent sore throat. The diarrhea continued and nausea became a fact of
everyday life; eating became increasingly difficult
- I began to lose weight.
I was frightened and depressed by the fact
that the illnesses were multiple, and that no
sooner would one go away than something else
would appear. I then began to experience with increasing frequency the most alarming and intimidating of all these maladies - night sweats.
Sometimes I would wake up crying because I was
so cold and frightened. No amount of preparation
before bed could relieve the anxiety and fear. . . .
I dreaded what I needed most - sleep. I didn't
want to close my eyes. 28
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
26. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307.
27. For definition of KS, see supra note 5; malignant neoplasm: a cancerous growth
in tissue.
28. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307. An autopsy report of 36 AIDS
victims found that 83% of the deaths were immediately due to opportunistic infection.
S. F. ehron., Sept. 7, 1984, at 22, col. 1.
29. Morin and Batchelor, Responding to the Psychological Crisis of AIDS: A
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The psychological impact on the patient is also profound.
The majority of patients are young, previously healthy people in
the prime of life. Upon diagnosis, they often go through a series
of reactions, including a loss of self-esteem, fear of alienation by
friends and lovers, fear of loss of physical attractiveness and
change in body image, guilt about sexual or drug-related behavior,30 fear of loss of control and dependency, loss of financial status, and fear of social stigmatization and exposure of lifestyle.
All this is compounded by the general fear of death and dyingY
The AIDS epidemic has a deep psychological impact on the
gay community as well. AIDS serves to magnify the pre-existing
social antipathy towards gay and lesbian people. 32 Psychologists
Clinical Perspective, 99 PUB. HEALTH REP. 4, 4 (1984).
Participation in treatment and medical research for a cure can be debilitating as
well. Another patient's experience:
My treatment with Alpha Interferon (a type of soluable protein produced by cells invaded by a virus which induce noninfected cells to produce antiviral proteins to inhibit viral
growth) required ten days of injections, ten days of rest, and
ten more daily injections. Within two hours of the first injection, I had severe chills, followed by high fever, and reversion
back to chills. These side-effects subsided after a few days, but
the most devastating were still to come. Over the 30-day
course of treatment, I noticed myself becoming profoundly
more fatigued and depressed. Where just before the course of
Interferon I was still running four miles a day, there were days
now that I barely wanted to get out of bed.
Id.
30. For some patients, the guilt can result in a rejection of their gay sexual identity
and a reaffirmation of any residual self-hatred manifest prior to the "coming out" process. See infra notes 34 and 93. Forstein, The Psychological Impact of AIDS, 11 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 77, 78 (1984).
31. Id. at 77. See Perry and Tross, Psychiatric Problems of AIDS Inpatients at the
New York Hospital: Preliminary Report, 99 PUB. HEALTH REP. 200, 201 (1984).
I In addition to these emotional reactions, the physical symptoms arising from AIDS
can result in psychiatric complications. Fatigue and weight-loss associated with
lymphadenopathy can lead to depression. Opportunistic infections which attack the central nervous system (such as encephalitis and primary lymphoma, see supra note 5)
often produce cognitive defects such as confusion, disorientation, loss of memory, mood
disturbances, involuntary or uncontrolled movements, and impulsive behavior. Perry and
Tross, supra, at 201, 203.
32. Forstein, supra note 30, at 77. Discrimination in employment has resulted in the
firing of gay employees because of fears that they may have AIDS. See Case v. County of
Tulare, No. 111532 (Super. Ct. Tulare Co. Cal. filed 1983) (hairdresser fired for fear he
(Oakland Co. Cir., Mich. 1983) (insurance
had AIDS); Truman v. Camden, No.
agent fired when employer learned he had AIDS). A suit being brought against Los Angeles paramedics claiming that they delayed in treating the plaintiff because they feared
(falsely) that he had AIDS. Bergman v. City of Los Angeles, No. C49773 (Los Angeles
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have documented general anxiety among the "worried well," hypochondriasis, and excessive preoccupation with bodily health as
anxiety states associated with gay men at risk of AIDS.33 Although no study has yet been done, researchers believe that the
threat of AIDS inhibits the process of acceptance of one's homosexual orientation, and exacerbates the difficulty of "coming
out. "34 Sexual dysfunction from fear of spreading the disease can
also be a problem. 31i
The impact of AIDS on the gay community is pervasive and
the community is responding to the threat. Groups have been
formed to combat the problem, including foundations devoted to
funding research and health education,3S and counseling and
support groups for the terminally ill. 37 State and Federal government has limited its role to medical research and treatment, and
has, in general, not attempted to limit sexual transmission of the
disease.
The first effort to prohibit the transmission of the disease
was made by the City of San Francisco, which has the highest
per capita number of AIDS victims. 3s On October 9, 1984, Dr.
Mervin Silverman, then Director of the San Francisco Public
Health Department, ordered the closing of 14 gay bathhouses
and sex establishments which he alleged "promote the spread of
AIDS."39 Within hours, six clubs reopened, challenging the order, and the City filed briefs seeking a court order enjoining the
businesses from operating. 40 The Superior Court allowed the
businesses to remain open, but enjoined certain practices and orSuper. Ct. Cal. filed May 1984). A New York City doctor who treats AIDS patients successfully defeated an eviction from his office by his neighbors who don't want AIDS patients coming into the building. People v. 49 West 12th Street, No. 43604-83 (App. Div.,
N.Y., filed 1983). Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing over AIDS, 6 NAT'L L. J. 1, 44
(July 9, 1984).
33. Morin and Batchelor, supra note 29, at 7-8.
34. Forstein, supra note 30, at 81. "Coming out" has been defined as the self-admission and acceptance of ones homosexuality and the communication to others of that fact.
Coleman, Developmental Stages of the Coming Out Process, HOMOSEXUALITY 151 (1982).
35. Forstein, supra note 30, at 81.
36. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, San Francisco AIDS Fund.
37. Shanti Project, Hospice.
38. Eight hundred and twenty six people have been diagnosed in San Francisco.
Telephone interview with Michael Serban, supra note 10.
39. S.F. Chron., Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Bay Area Reporter, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col.
1.
40. S.F. Chron., supra note 39, at 18; Bay Area Reporter, supra note 39, at 1.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2

308

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:301

dered the businesses to hire employees to enforce compliance
with the injunction. 41 The legal battle will test the state's authority to limit gay sexual behavior for the avowed purpose of
preventing the spread of AIDS.
This analysis of the state's authority to limit sexual behavior in gay bathhouses will begin by examining the precedents involving the use of quarantine and nuisance statutes to control
the spread of communicable diseases. A discussion of common
law limitations on the use of those statutes will follow. The constitutional analysis begins with the right to privacy embodied in
the United States and California Constitutions, and its relationship to gay sexual intimacy generally. The application of rational basis and strict scrutiny standards will be analyzed and
arguments presented in favor of applying strict scrutiny. The
state's compelling interest in stopping the spread of AIDS will
be analyzed under strict scrutiny with appropriate attention to
achieving the state's interest without broadly infringing on the
individual's privacy. Discussion of enforcement of a limitation
on bathhouse sexual activity and the fourth amendment issues it
raises will conclude the Comment.
II. STATE'S
HEALTH

INTEREST

IN

PROTECTING

PUBLIC

Protecting health and safety has long been recognized as a
legitimate exercise of the state's police power.'2 The state's police power is vested entirely in the legislature,43 and it alone can
41. S.F. Chron., Nov. 29, 1984, at I, col. 5. The order specifically restrains the business from operating private rooms on the premises; orders the hiring of one employee for
every 20 patrons to survey the entire premises every 20 minutes and expel all patrons
engaging in high risk sexual activity as defined by the San Francisco AIDS Foundation;
the removal of doors to individual rooms and cubicles; and education of patrons toward
the prevention of high risk sexual activity. San Francisco v. Owen, No. 830-321 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Nov. 28, 1984) (order granting preliminary injunction).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
43. DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 681, 260 P.2d 98, 101-02 (1953).
The Legislature is possessed of the entire police power of the
state, except as its power is limited by the provisions of the
Constitution and other laws applicable thereto. Such police
power is an indispensable per<lgative of the sovereignty and
may not be legally limited ... so long as it is not unreasonable and arbitrarily invoked and applied (emphasis in the
original).
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delegate enforcement authority.44 Health and safety legislation
is given broad and liberal construction by courts,411 and it is only
limited by provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. 48
The state's interest in protecting the health of its people is
strengthened as the particular threat to health becomes
greater. 47 The stronger the state interest in protecting against a
threat to health and safety, the broader construction given to
the statute addressing that threat.
In the area of communicable diseases, the state has traditionally asserted its police power through quarantine isolation,48
Id. See Justesen's Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Tulare, 12 Cal. 2d 324, 329, 84 P.2d 140,
143 (1938); Boyd v. City of Sierra Madre, 41 Cal. App. 520, 523, 183 P. 230, 232 (1919);
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 490, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925). "It is also
competent for the Legislature, within the Constitutional limits of its powers, to declare
any act criminal and make the repetition or continuance thereof a public nuisance ...
but it is not the province of the courts to ordain such jurisdiction for themselves." People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 879, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941) (quoting State v. Ehrlick, 65 W.
Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935, 940 (1909)).
44. It is within the authority of the City of San Francisco to adopt regulations to
promote health and safety, such as quarantine. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 11. DeAryan,
119 Cal. App. 2d at 681, 260 P.2d at 101-02.
45. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 557, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (1966); In re
Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 244, 180 P. 644-45 (1919); People v. Johnson, 129 Cal. App.
2d I, 7-8, 277 P.2d 45, 50 (1954).
46. DeAryan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 681, 260 P.2d at 101.
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 130, 150 (1973). The higher mortality rate among women
receiving illegal abortions and abortions in the second and third trimester of pregnancy
was a basis to assert a greater state interest in regulating conditions under which abortions are performed. Because the state's interest was stronger over more dangerous abortions late in pregnancy, Roe allowed states to ban abortions in the third trimester while
forbidding the banning of them in the first and second.
48. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3000-3125 (Deering 1981). CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
17, R 2520 (1981) defines quarantine as:
[t)he limitation of freedom of movement of persons or animals
that have been exposed to a communicable disease for a period of time equal to the longest usual incubation period of the
disease, in such a manner as to prevent effective contact with
those not exposed. If the disease is one requiring quarantine of
the contacts in addition to isolation of the case, the local
health officer shall determine the contacts who are subject to
quarantine, specify the place to which they shall be quarantined, and issue instructions accordingly.
Isolation is defined as "separation of infected persons from other persons, for the
period of communicability in such places and under such conditions as will prevent the
transmission of the infectious agent." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R 2515 (1981).
Modified isolation shall be prescribed by the local health officer when only modified
isolation is required. The technique of isolation shall depend on the disease. 17 CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R 2518 (1981).
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and nuisance abatement. 49 Government officials are likely, therefore, to consider traditional quarantine, isolation, and nuisance
The State Department of Health may "quarantine, isolate, inspect, and disinfect
persons animals, houses, rooms, other property, places, cities or localities, whenever in its
judgment such action is necessary to protect or preserve the public health." CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 3051 (Deering 1981). The State Department may "establish and maintain places of quarantine and isolation," § 3112, "adopt and enforce rules and regulations
requiring isolation ... or quarantine for any of the contagious, infectious or communicable diseases if in the opinion of the state department such action is necessary . . . ," §
3123, take any measures necessary to "ascertain the nature of the disease and prevent its
spread," § 3053, and "take possession or control of the body of a living person," § 3053.
The California Administrative Code gives local health officials the authority to examine
and diagnose the infected person, investigate and determine the source of the infection,
and "take appropriate steps to prevent or control the spread of the disease," 17 CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R 2512 (1981). All persons have a duty to obey any health officer's
isolation orders, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3116 (Deering 1981) and anyone who
opposes or neglects the orders of a health official rejecting quarantine or isolation is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine of $50.00 to $1,000 or up to 90 days in jail
or both. §§ 3350, 3354.
49. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-3499 (Deering 1984). Nuisance, is defined as:
[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in
the customary manner, of any navigable lake or river, bay,
stream, canal or basin, or any public park, square, street or
highway is a nuisance.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479.
"A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon the individual may be unequal." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480.
"Every nuisance not included in the definition of [§ 3480] is private." CAL. CIV. CODE §
3481.
"A public nuisance may be abated by any public body or officer authorized thereto
by law." CAL. CIV. CODE §3494. The remedies against a public nuisance are (1) criminal
indictment or information, (2) civil action, or (3) abatement. CAL. CIV. CODE §3491.
The common law definition of a public nuisance includes "activity which endangers
the health or safety or property of a considerable number of persons, offends public
morals, or interferes with the comfort or convenience of a considerable number of people." O. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN AND A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 116 (3d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROPERTY LAW]. Public nuisances regarding interferences with public health have been found in cases concerning a hogpen, keeping diseased animals, and a malarial pond. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
643-44 (5th ed. 1984).
"To be considered public, the nuisance must affect an interest common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or several . . . . It is not necessary,
however, that the entire community be affected, so long as the nuisance will interfere
with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public right." PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra at 645. "Most nuisance cases involve recurrent activity rather than an
isolated wrongful act." BASIC PROPERTY LAW, supra at 117. Therefore, some courts require that the activity continue or recur over a period of time to be a nuisance. [d.
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statutes as a means to control the spread of AIDS,lio Constitutional challenges to quarantine and isolation statutes have been
denied by courts citing the broad discretion given to legislative
enactments promoting health and safety,lil These California
quarantine cases were decided prior to 1950, and therefore did
not address these statutes in light of modern constitutional developments in privacy, due process, equal protection and search
and seizure, (Later sections will discuss these doctrines as they
concern the conflicting interests of the AIDS carriers and the
state),1i2 The quarantine cases fashioned a "reasonable cause"
limitation on the police powers of the state to quarantine and
isolate,li3
Reasonable cause in the public health context requires that
health officials have reasonable grounds to believe that a person
is afflicted with a communicable disease before they can examine
or isolate the person,li4 A mere suspicion, unsupported by facts
giving rise to probable cause, is not enough to justify placing a
person under quarantine, "It will not do to allow the inference of
50. Since AIDS has been shown to be transmitted among homosexual and bisexual
men via close mucosal contact during sexual intercourse, and not by casual contact,
supra note 14 and accompanying text, it is most likely that modified isolation of AIDS
carriers would be ordered before quarantine or full isolation. Such modified isolation has
been proposed in a memorandum by James Chin, M.D., Chief of Infectious Diseases
Section, California Department of Health Services, Proposed Public Health Action in
Response to a Documented Recalcitrant AIDS Patient. (Dec. I, 1983).
San Francisco v. Owen, No. 830-321 (Super. Ct. S.F. Cal. filed Oct. 18, 1984) (City
attorneys sought an injunction on the theory that the 14 bathhouses and sex establishments ordered closed were a public nuisance).
51. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d at 557,54 Cal. Rptr. at 663; In re Johnson, 40 Cal.
App. at 244, 180 P. at 664-45; In re Culver, 187 Cal. 437, 440, 202 P. 661, 663 (1921).
[Bly virtue of the broad power conferred by §§ 2979 and
2979(a) of the Political Code ... the State Board of Health
has power to order the quarantine of persons who have come
in contact with cases and carriers of contagious diseases when
the Board shall deem it necessary to preserve the public
health.
Id.; DeAryan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 682, 260 P.2d at 102. "The determination by the legislative body that a particular regulation is necessary for the protection or preservation of
health is conclusive on the courts except only to the limitation that it must be a reasonable determination ... and must not infringe upon the rights secured by the Constitution." Id.
52. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
53. See In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. 239, 244, 186 P. 170, 172 (1919); In re Halko,
256 Cal. App. 2d at 553, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 644; DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674,
682, 260 P.2d at 102; In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 51, 195 P. 1077, 1077 (1921).
54. In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. at 244, 186 P. at 172.
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probable cause to be drawn from a mere suspicion. "1111 Although
the cases have more or less loosely used "reasonable cause" interchangably with "probable cause,"IIS the level of cause required
to be shown by the state was not synonymous with the more
probable than not standard in the criminal setting. Quarantine
orders were issued to hold suspected prostitutes in custody until
trial on the supposition that their release would allow them to
spread venereal disease. 1I7 The courts required only that the
state make a showing that the woman be of a class of persons
(prostitutes) likely to have venereal disease in order to establish
reasonable cause that the woman had venereal disease. liS A
showing that it was more probable than not that the individual
prostitute had venereal disease was not required.
Underlying the reasonableness requirement of these cases is
the use of quarantine statutes to restrain a criminal class of persons where the state viewed the usual criminal law processes as
inadequate. These cases are distinguishable in application to the
bathhouse setting because gay men are not a criminal class. liS In
determining the reasonableness requirement, courts should balance the need to quarantine in terms of the likelihood of reducing the spread of the disease against the invasion of liberty
which would result. so Therefore, the first step in the inquiry is to
determine the likelihood that bathhouse sexual conduct results
in the transmission of AIDS. The extent of the invasion of a protected liberty interest is discussed below. S)
Whether it is likely that a bathhouse patron will have sex
with an AIDS carrier is a question of fact to be determined by
medical testimony and research. The latest studies show a
strong correlation between the number of sexual partners and
55. In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 384, 198 P. 814, 816 (1921). See also In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. at 51, 195 P. at 1077.
56. In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. at 383, 198 P. at 816 ("reasonable or probable"); In re
Shepard, 51 Cal. App. at 51, 195 P. at 1077 (case dismissed because facts did not establish even a "well-defined suspicion.").
57. See In re Arata 52 Cal. App. 380, 198 P. 814; In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49,
195 P. 1077.
58. In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. at 383-84, 198 P. at 814; In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. at
51, 195 P. at 1077.
59. Homosexual conduct is no longer a criminal act in California.
60. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967).
61. See infra notes 73-116 and accompanying text.
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the likelihood of contracting AIDS.62 The Jaffe study found the
frequency of intercourse was significantly correlated with ten
other variables, including meeting partners in bathhouses, a history of syphillis and other sexually transmitted diseases, and the
use of street drugs and nitrite inhalants. 63 Friedman-Kien attempts to explain a similar finding by associating numerous sex
partners, use of bathhouses, sexually transmitted diseases, and
drug usage with the development of a gay culture in the urban
environment. 64 The not-yet-completed Darrow study, nowever,
is said to show no significant correlation between bathhouse sex
and the spread of AIDS.65
Although it seems clear that the frequency of sexual activity
with different partners increases the probability of contracting
AIDS, it is not demonstrable that the bathhouse environment
itself adds significantly to the risks of contagion. At best, there
is a correlation which is not yet fully understood or proven. The
state would have to make a showing that restricting sexual conduct in bathhouses would be likely to reduce the spread of AIDS
in order to satisfy the threshold reasonable cause requirement of
the quarantine cases.
.
If a correlation is found between bathhouse sex and the
spread of AIDS, nuisance law would support closure only if more
narrow means of "abating" the problem do not exist. 66
Where the decree absolutely prohibits any acts,
there should be abundant evidence that the continuance of the acts will inevitably result in irreparable injury. In the absence of such strong evidence, the decree should merely enjoin the doing
of the particular acts in a manner calculated to
62. See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 147, 149; Friedman-Kien, Laubenstein, Rubenstein
and Boimovici-Klein, Disseminated Kaposi's sarcoma in Homosexual Men, 96 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 693, 697 (1982); Marmor, Laubenstein and Friedman-Kien, Risk Factors for Kaposi's sarcoma in Homosexual Men, LANCET 1083, 1085 (1982); A new study
underway by Darrow of the CDC has also been reported to show a correlation with sexual promiscuity. Bay Area Reporter, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
63. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 147.
64. Friedman Kien, Laubenstein, Rubenstein, and Boimovici-Klien, supra note 62,
at 697.
65. Bay Area Reporter, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
66. Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 843-44, 243 P.2d 497, 509 (1952); Morton v.
Superior Court. 124 Cal. App. 2d 577. 582. 269 P.2d 81. 84 (1954).
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injure the plaintiff.67

Injunctions to abate a public nuisance where the business is not
per se unlawful88 should be limited in scope to just afford the
state relief from the potential spread of AIDS.89 Bathhouses are
not a nuisance per se because their operation is not in violation
of any state statute. 70 Therefore, a court injunction restricting
their operation can only be as broad as necessary to stop the
spread of the disease. "[T]he law is clear that injunctions against
carrying on legitimate business should go no further than is absolutely necessary to protect the lawful rights of the parties
seeking such injunction. "71
III. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN SEXUAL
INTIMACY
If the threshold correlation can be shown between sexual intercourse in the bathhouse and the spread of AIDS, to what extent can the government regulate the sexual practices of bathhouse patrons for the purposes of stopping its spread?72 The
answer depends on the classification of the activity for purposes
of constitutional analysis.
..

The United States Constitution's right of privacy is founded
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and is applied to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend67. Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d at 583, 269 P.2d at 86.
68. A per se nuisance is one in which its operation is always unlawful, no matter
how operated (e.g., a building with numerous code violations which threatens the health
and safety of the community). See People v. Wheeler, 30 Cal. App. 3d 282, 106 Cal. Rptr.
260 (1973).
69. See Fresno v. Fresno Canal and Irrigation Co., 98 Cal. 179, 183-84, 32 P. 943,
945 (1893); Byers v. Colonial Irrigation Co., 134 Cal. 553, 555, 66 P. 732, 733 (1901);
McPheeters v. McMahon, 131 Cal. App. 418, 425; 21 P.2d 606, 609 (1933); Morton v.
Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d at 582, 269 P.2d at 85; Enos v. Harmon, 157 Cal. App.
2d 746, 750, 321 P.2d 810, 813 (1958); People v. Mason, 124 Cal. App. 3d 348, 354, 177
Cal. Rptr. 284, 288 (1981).
70. See infra note 72.
71. People v. Mason, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 354, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
72. The author makes an assumption in this Comment that gay bathhouses are legal
in most major metropolitan centers where adult consensual same-sex sexual conduct is
not criminal, and the basis for restricting the activities which go on inside will be to stop
the spread of AIDS. Other bases, besides health protection, such as welfare and morals,
could also be argued by states where such conduct is criminalized. The author leaves
criticism of these bases to other writers.
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ment. 73 It is a fundamental right of the individuaF4 which the
Supreme Court has extended to decisions relating to marriage,711
procreation,76 contraception,77 family relationships,78 childrearing,79 and abortion. 80 The Court in Doe u. Commonwealth's Attorney summarily affirmed that there is no fundamental right to
privacy in homosexual intercourse,81 but in a later case men73. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), the right to privacy is
drawn from the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, including the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th
and 14th amendments. Id. at 484-85. The right may also "emanate from the totality of
the constitutional scheme under which we live," Id. at 494. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
74. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973).
75. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967).
76. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
78. Prince v. Mass., 312 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
79. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
81. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(summary affirmance of 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)). The district court in Doe
rejected the constitutional challenge of a Virginia sodomy statute criminalizing adult
consensual same sex sexual activity. Without briefs or oral argument, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed the district court's decision by a 6 to 3 vote (Marshall, Brennan and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
The reasoning the lower court had used to hold that the statute did not "offend the
Bill of Rights or any other Amendments," Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1199, is flawed. Using a
minimal rational basis test, the state never had to show its claim that homosexuality
actually caused moral delinquency, but only that it was "likely to end in a contribution
to moral delinquency." Judge Bryan based his finding that there was no fundamental
right on gratuitous Supreme Court dicta by Justices Goldberg and Harlan, in previous
minority opinions. Id. at 1201-02.
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids . ... " Id. at 1201 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring)). "I would not suggest that adultery homosexuality,
fornication and incest are immune from criminal inquiry,
however privately practiced." Id. at 1201 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, 'J., dissenting)).
"The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the
sexual powers may be used and legal societal context in which
children are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding
adultery, fornication, and homosexual practices which express
the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance
of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area
must build upon that basis.
Id. at 1201-02 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting)),'
Bryan ignored Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 454-55, which expanded the privacy
right beyond the limits of the marital bedroom. In support of the statute he cited Lovisi
v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), a case involving exposure of heterosexual
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tioned that the issue of privacy in consensual sexual activity had
not yet been settled. 82 Although courts have followed the Supreme Court's affirmance in Doe, some courts view the question
as unsettled. 83 Because of the unsettled state of the law and the
lack of a written Supreme Court opinion on the issue of adult
consensual same-sex sexual intercourse, reexamination of the
right to privacy issues involved is justified.
Many of the privacy cases concern decisions arIsmg from
sexual relations. The right to privacy in sexual relations has
been found in the decisions to bear and beget children,84 and
whether to use' contraception or have an abortion. 811 These decisions are different sides of the same coin. The decision to procreate involves a decision in each act of sexual intercourse whether
contraception will be used, and if conception occurs, whether an
abortion will be undertaken. Implicit in the decision to use consex acts to children, and having no analogy to private adult consensual same-sex sexual
intercourse. Id. at 1202.
As a summary affirmance, the precedential value is limited. No Supreme Court Justice has written an opinion on the issue. No more can be read into it than was necessary
to decide the precise issues before the Court. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 78485 n.5 (1983). Professor Tribe argues that the precise issue for the Court's summary
affirmance may not have been the merits of the claim, but a justiciability issue. He argues plaintiffs brought the suit as a facial challenge and were apparently never
threatened with prosecution under the statute. The Court may have affirmed on the basis that the case was not ripe, and that an affirmance instead of an order to vacate the
judgment is consistent with denying relief to plaintiffs on jurisdictional grounds. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978). Notwithstanding Tribe's strained argument, judges have cited Doe as controlling precedent in privacy cases regarding adult
consensual same-sex sexual intercourse. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir.
1976); De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979); Gaylord v.
Tacoma School Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1340 (Wash. 1977); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d
778, 809 (9th Cir. 1980); Matlovich v. Secretary of Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (issue not reached).
82. "The Court has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults .... " Carey v. Population Servo Int'I., 431 U.S. 678, 689 n.5
(1977). Since Carey was a case concerning contraception, the unanswered question may
only be with regards to heterosexual private consensual sexual behavior.
83. New York V. Onofre, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1980); Beller V.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 810; Baker V. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
84. See Skinner V. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (forced sterilization of felons held
unconstitutional).
85. See Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy in the use of
contraceptives in marital sexual intercourse); Eisenstadt V. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right to privacy in use of contraceptives for non-marital sexual intercourse); Roe V.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy protects the decision between a woman and
her doctor whether to have an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss2/2

16

Collier: Restricting Sexual Conduct

1985]

RESTRICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT

317

traception is the decision to engage in sexual intercourse. 86
The Supreme Court has retained the artificial dichotomy
between decisions to have sexual intercourse and decisions
whether to bear and beget children, protecting the latter,87 yet
not reaching an answer to the former. 88 Heterosexual women
would not see a distinction between the right to decide to have
sexual intercourse and the right to decide to use contraception
or have an abortion. For the woman, the decision to have sex is,
in every instance, a decision whether to bear and beget children.
There is no meaningful distinction between the two. From the
vantage point of the potentially pregnant woman, both decisions
should have fundamental right status.
The idea of privacy protection over choices fundamentally
affecting the person was further stressed in Roe v. Wade. 89 The
fundamental nature of the decision to have an abortion was illustrated by emphasizing the detrimental i.mpact that denying
the choice would have on the woman:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There
is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem
of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved. 90

Similarly, denial of sexual preference may be distressful for
86. One court described the privacy right in sexual relations as follows: "It is not the
marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal the sexual behavior of human
beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself or something intensely private to the
individual that calls for constitutional protection." Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620,
625 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
87. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 454-55. "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as to the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." [d.
88. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689.
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
90. [d. at 153.
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the lesbian or gay man. Much study has been devoted to the
psychological aspects of homosexuality. The American Psychiatric Association no longer considers homosexuality a disease or
disorder, but rather an alternative expression of sexuality.91 Social and legal biases against adult consensual same-sex sexual
activity create pressures on the individual to repress homosexual
desires.
Implicit in the denial of the right to choose sexual preference is a moral or psychological judgment that the activity is
wrong. This leaves the homosexual the choice of either repressing his/her feelings or renouncing his/her homosexuality,
thereby being "saved" or "cured." Repression can lead to emotional and psychological harm, and attempts to cure what is not
a disease have proved ludicrous and harmfu1. 92
Homosexuals who have not yet "come out"93 often feel
shame, guilt and loneliness because of social judgments condemning homosexuality:
To grow up in a family where the word 'homosexual' was whispered, to play in a playground and
hear the words 'faggot' and 'queer,' to go to
church and hear of 'sin' and then to college and
hear of 'illness,' and finally to the counseling
center that promises to 'cure' is hardly an environment of freedom and voluntary choice. 94

An environment of freedom of choice for the homosexual
has been shown to liberate the person of guilt and shame. 91i The
protection that inclusion of same-sex sexual intercourse within
privacy would afford the "choice" to be homosexual would un91. 9 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1 (Jan. 2. 1974).
92. Gonsiorek. Social Psychological Concepts in the Understanding of Homosexuality. HOMOSEXUALITY 118 (1982). Morality as a basis for denying adult same-sex sexual
privacy is too large a topic to deal with in this Comment.
93. "Coming out" has been defined as the self-admission and acceptance of ones
homosexuality and the communication to others of the fact. Coleman. Developmental
States of the Coming Out Process. HOMOSEXUALITY 151 (~.982).
94. Davidson. Politics. Ethics and Therapy for Homosexuality. HOMOSEXUALITY 94
(1982).
95. Coleman. Developmental Stages of Coming Out Process. HOMOSEXUALITY. 150.
(citing Silverstein. Behavior Modification and the Gay Community. (Oct. 1972) paper
presented to the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy. Annual
Convention).
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doubtedly reduce the shame, guilt and maladjustment which results from stigmatization.
Fundamental right status should be extended to adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse as well. A homosexual's decision whether to follow his or her sexual orientation is a basic
decision in his or her life. The choice to engage in adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse is essential to the self-determination of the individual over matters of intimate concern and
great importance. It is basic to significant intimate relations,
family relations, friends and associations. The liberty to make
this intimate decision has a similar impact on homosexuals as do
the decisions to marry, procreate or not to have children impact
on heterosexuals.
The California right to privacy96 also protects an area of intimacy in personal relations. This fundamental right extends its
protections to the home, family, thought, emotions and expressions, personality, and freedom of communion and association. 9?
It protects the "right to be left alone."98 The California Supreme
Court has included "sex" within the right to privacy. 99
Private adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse should
be protected by right. Homoeroticism is an innate and intimate
aspect of a homosexual's personality, emotions and expressions.
Central to any sexual experience is the intimate rapport and
sharing protected by the freedom of communion. In many instances, the lesbian or gay relationship is the center of the
.
couple's family and home life.
On equal protection grounds, a strong argument can be
made that the denial of fundamental privacy right status for
adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse results in differential treatment between heterosexuals and homosexuals. State
96. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable righta.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL.
CONST. art. I § 1 (emphasis added).
97. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d, 757, 774, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105, 533 P.2d 222, 233
(1975).
98.Id.
99. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359, 458 P.2d 194, 199
(1969).
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sodomy statutes either explicitly or implicitly treat homosexuals
differently than heterosexuals. Either their terms are limited to
same-sex sexual conduct or are discriminatory in effect by forbidding anal and oral intercourse (the primary method of sexual
intercourse for homosexuals). Statutes which forbid adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse but not adult consensual
heterosexual intercourse treat homosexuals differently. A determination of fundamental right status for adult consensual heterosexual sexual intercourse loo but not same-sex sexual intercourse
would be a denial of equal protection of a fundamental right and
challenges to sodomy statutes would be entitled to strict scrutiny.lol However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a
fundamental right to adult consensual heterosexual sexual intercourse. Therefore, the government need only show a rational basis why adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse should be
restricted. Because the California Constitution recognizes heterosexual sex as a protected privacy right, California courts would
apply strict scrutiny.
A.

A Rational Basis to Restrict Same-Sex Sexual
Intercourse

The present state of federal law appears to afford no fundamental right to privacy in adult consensual same-sex sexual activity although this is not well settled. lo2 Restrictions on this activity to prevent the spread of AIDS are limited only in that
they be reasonably based and not arbitrary. The rational basis
test would be met by a minimal showing that bathhouse patrons
engage in sexual activity which is likely to spread AIDS, and
that closing them (or restricting the types of sexual activity to
those acts not likely to transmit the AIDS agent) is a reasonable
means to stop its spread.
The state has a similar case under an equal protection challenge because the classification of gay men as a group to be denied sexual intercourse can be rationally supported by evidence
that AIDS is spread by anal and oral sexual intercourse and that
it has so far been limited almost entirely to the four risk groups
100. See supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.
101. San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973).
102. See supra notes 81, 82 and accompanying text.
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in which gay men constitute the large majority. lOS
Bathhouse proprietors and some gay attorneys have framed
counter-arguments to this basis of rationality. Closing bathhouses is not a rational response to the state's interest in
preventing the spread of AIDS if it can be shown that bathhouses are safer places to have sexual intercourse than other environments. They claim that closings will only change the location of the dangerous behavior, not the behavior itself, and that
bathhouses have bathing facilities, educational programs, and
condom distribution which make the sexual activity safer. They
also claim that a rise in public sexual activity in unclean parks
and restrooms has occurred since the baths have become unpopular. In sum, the counter-argument is that the closing of the
bathhouses will do nothing to stop the spread of the disease. l04
On the other hand, the truism that closing the bathhouses
only restricts the place where the acts occur, not the act itself, is
misleading. The state's interest is clearly to limit the spread of
the disease by limiting, where it has the power, dangerous sexual
activity in the gay population. By closing the bathhouses it is
limiting the opportunity to engage in sexual activity, and may
do the same in parks or restrooms if it can prove that the danger
of AIDS spreading occurs in those places as well. The state need
only proceed one step at a time towards its goal. Therefore,
under a rational basis standard, a court would uphold limiting
the sexual activity which can be shown to spread AIDS.
The consequence of a rational basis standard for sexual privacy extends to other gay rights areas as well. Logical connections between legitimate state interests and statutes which differentially treat homosexuals and subject them to discriminatory
burdens appear more anacronistic, irrational and poorly articulated in light of the growth of lesbian and gay liberation movements. To be sure, courts have proved a barrier to the development of gay rights. 1011 But the threat of AIDS presents a new
103. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
104. Kohorn. Achtenberg. Hitchens. Coles. Steel. and McShane. Draft Preliminary
Report: AIDS and the Regulation of Bathhouses at 8 (Aug. 9. 1984) (submitted to the
Public Protection Committee. Board of Supervisors. City and County of San Francisco)
[hereinafter cited as AIDS and the Regulation of Bathhouses).
105. See Rivera. Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
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basis for state action limiting gay sexual privacy in the bathhouse and bedroom, for discrimination in the workplace, public
benefits, and government and military service. Furnished with a
rational basis for the criminalization of gay sex, sodomy laws
could continue to impose legal disabilities on lesbians and gay
men through justifying discrimination against a "criminal" class.
The nature of the privacy interest involved is highly intimate; the bases of decision making concern innate emotional
and psychological characteristics in the individual; the denial of
the choice fundamentally impacts the individual's sexual and familial expressions as well as social relationships; and the legal
consequences from a denial of privacy protection results in disabilities which could extend far beyond the bedroom or bathhouse. Under the Federal and California Constitutions, the fragile character and intensity of the privacy value at stake106
justifies a stricter level of scrutiny than the rational basis test
affords.
B. Applicability of Strict Scrutiny
In applying a higher level of scrutiny, a fundamental right
can be infringed upon only by an important 107 or compelling108
public interest. The state's interest in preventing the spread of
AIDS is a compelling interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held on two separate occasions
that the state's interest in preventing the spread of communicable diseases outweighs the individual's interest in free exercise of
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 814 (Federal Civil Service employees), 831 (security clearances), 837, 854-55 (armed forces personnel), 860 (licenses), 86074 (public school teachers), 874, 878 (marriage), 883 (divorce); but contra 924 (universities and other public forums) (1979).
106. "[Olne might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials . . . . " Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
Professor Tribe describes the need for stricter judicial scrutiny in cases where the rights
involved are "politically fragile," i.e., highly susceptible to emasculation in the particular
case. The "character and intensity" of the right in a particular case determine its political resilience. L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 575.
107. Middle-level scrutiny. Rostger v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
108. Strict scrutiny. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
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religion. 109 In more recent cases it has held that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting viable fetal life,l1o and the
health and safety of pregnant mothers.lll AIDS is a deadly communicable disease for which there is at present no cure. ll2 The
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has made it a
top priority concern. 11S Thousands have died, and the death toll
rises at a logarithmic rate. 114 Stopping its spread is an interest
which follows the line of compelling health and safety interests
found in the abortion and communicable disease cases. The nature of the threat may be so compelling that most courts would
find that closing bathhouses would withstand any degree of
scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny is the most appropriate standard of review.
It allows for the assertion of the compelling state interest while
recognizing the intimate privacy interests of the gay man. It provides for the repression of dangerous sexual intercourse when
necessary, while allowing safe sexual intercourse m to continue.
The number of bathhouses in anyone locality is small enough
that state or local regulation could be accomplished with relative
ease, limiting the necessity for the usual broad tolerance of overinclusiveness. 118 The state would also have to show that regulating bathhouse sexual intercourse is necessary to limit the spread
of AIDS, and that it is as or more likely to spread there than in
other areas. Closing those establishments without this proof may
give the public a false sense of security that the problem has
been corrected when in fact it has not.
109. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) "a community has the right to protect
itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members." [d. at
27. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("The right to practice religion freely
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease
or the latter to ill health or death.").
110. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (compelling point is at viability).
111. [d. (compelling point is approximately at the end of the first trimester).
112. See supra notes 3, 4 and accompanying text.
113. Brandt, The Concentric Effects of AIDS, 99 PUB. HEALTH REP. I, 1 (1984).
114. Selik, Haverkos and Curran, supra note I, at 494.
115. "Safe sex" is sexual intercourse which does not involve the exchange of bodily
fluids which may carry the AIDS agent. Safe sex practices include mutual masturbation,
anal intercourse with a condom, and "fisting" (inserting the hand in the anus). Dangerous sex includes oral-genital and oral-anal ("rimming"), and anal intercourse without a
condom.
116. L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 999.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2

324

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:301

Proof of the necessity of limiting the type of sexual conduct
in bathhouses in order to stop the spread of AIDS is crucial in
placing boundaries on an order limiting a certain type of sexual
conduct. The extension of such a limitation to other environments, such as the bedroom, by only showing that it is rational,
but not necessary, to prevent the spread of AIDS, poses a
greater danger to gay sexual privacy rights than the closing of
fourteen sex establishments. If the state can show that it is the
nature of bathhouse sex, its mUltiple and anonymous sex contacts, which poses the threat of spread, then by comparison, gay
sexual activity in one's bedroom is safer because it lacks these
factors. The result could be an order which only limits proven
dangerous sexual conduct and restricts its consequence to the
bathhouse environment.
Closing bathhouses is an overbroad action which invades
the privacy of patrons engaging in safe sex. A less burdensome
alternative would be forbidding dangerous sexual intercourse
which could spread an AIDS agent. Coupled with condom distribution and education on safe sexual practices, this alternative
protects the public from the spread of the disease while allowing
the private conduct to continue in a limited way.
V.

ENFORCEMENT

Documentation of unsafe sexual intercourse in bathhouses
for the purpose of either enforcing a ban on unsafe intercourse
or to gather evidence for the closing of establishments where it
occurs raises fourth amendment search and seizure issues. Bathhouses are public businesses in that the general public may use
them. However, a significant amount of sexual activity occurs
behind closed doors in private rooms which are rented by the
patrons. Unsafe sexual intercourse which occurs in the common
areas would be in plain view of government officers,117 and would
have no justifiable expectation of privacy. Therefore, observation of the activity would not be a "search" subject to fourth
117. Whether the inspection is done by police officers or by Health Department officers, the government is still limited by the strictures of the fourteenth amendment.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959) which exempted quarantine searches from fourth amendment requirements); Parish v. Civil Servo Comm'n., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 262-63, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628, 425
P.2d 223, 228 (1967).
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amendment limitations. H8 Activity behind closed doors in
rented rooms occurs with a justifiable expectation of privacy
which can only be invaded by a reasonable inspection based on
probable cause. H9
A series of cases involving adult consensual same-sex sexual
activity in toilet stalls in California public restrooms sheds light
on the nature of a reasonable search in a bathhouse environment. The privacy protection afforded toilet stalls in these cases
is analogous to the privacy protections which should be afforded
cubicles in bathhouses. Toilet stalls and cubicles are both enclosed areas within public places. The expectation of privacy afforded rented cubicles is at least as high as a toilet stall in a
public restroom. The toilet stall cases originally took two different tacks: the Bielicki-Britt l20 line of cases held unconstitutional
all clandestine surveillance l2l of public restrooms without probable cause that the specific individuals inside were going to commit sex acts;122 the Smayda 123 line of cases held that where the
acts were committed in an area of the restroom where the officer
could see them if he were present in the room, then there was no
justifiable expectation of privacy to protect, and no search subject to fourth amendment strictures. 124
118. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
119. California courts have required probable cause before the state may restrict the
individual pursuant to its quarantine powers, see supra note 53 and accompanying text,
and in searches of public restrooms by police enforcing penal statutes against public sex
acts, infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
120. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288
(1962); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817 (1962).
121. Clandestine surveillance was that done by officers hidden from view of the restroom patrons, e.g., behind a wall or in a closet.
122. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 553, 371 P.2d
288, 289 (1962) ("there would appear to be no doubt ... that the acts of Officer Hetzel
constituted a 'search'. . . ."); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 24 Cal. Rptr.
849,851,374 P.2d 817, 819 (1962) ("The crucial fact ... [was] the manner in which the
police observed a place - and persons in that place - which is ordinarily understood to
afford personal privacy to individual occupants."); People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20,
23,98 Cal. Rptr. 925, 927 (1971) ("We believe that the enactment of section 653n enunciates a public policy against clandestine observation of public restrooms and renders it
reasonable for users thereof to expect their privacy will not be surreptitiously violated.").
123. Smayda v. U.S., 352 F.2d 251 (1965).
124. [d. at 255. ("By using a public place appellants risked observation, and they
have no constitutional right to demand that such observation be made only by one whom
they could see."); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 174, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676, 678
(1962) ("Their activities were not, as in Bielicki, such that no other member of the public could have seen them."); People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 135, 29 Cal. Rptr.
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People v. Triggs resolved the conflict among the cases by
affirming the Bielicki-Britt line of cases. Clandestine surveillance constituting a general search without probable cause violates the fourth amendment and Article I, §19 of the California
Constitution, whether or not the activity could have been viewed
from inside the restroom.121i Any clandestine observation of activities inside bathhouses without probable cause would be unconstitutional, even if the activity could have been viewed by the
officer if he were in a common area of the bathhouse. 126

Clandestine surveillance would require the cooperation of
bathhouse proprietors who, given the consequences of discovery
of unsafe sexual intercourse, would not likely acquiesce. The
more likely method of enforcement would be sending undercover
agents into the bathhouses as patrons. Without probable cause
those agents could only observe activity in plain view of common
areas, and not within closed rooms unless invited inside. A
"[m]an's constitutionally protected right of personal privacy not
only abides with him while he is the householder ... but cloaks
him when as a member of the public he is temporarily occupying
a room - including a toilet stall - to the extent that it is offered to the public for private... use. 127 Under the probable
cause standard used in the toilet stall cases, in order to justify
entry, it would be difficult for the state to show sufficient facts
that unsafe sex was probable in a closed cubicle.
Another method for determining the level of cause required
to conduct a reasonable bathhouse search is to use the balancing
approach articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court.l2S The likelihood of achieving the state's goals in preventing the spread of
AIDS via "unsafe" sexual conduct is weighed against the privacy
invasion to the individual. 129 In Camara the Court determined
492, 494 (1963) (UMerely to observe what is perfectly apparent to any member of the
general public who might happen to be on the premises is not a search.") (quoting People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d at 176-77, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (1962».
125. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 891-92, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412-13, 506 P.2d
232, 236-37 (1973).
126. It might, however, be argued that the very act of rental of such a private room
in a bathhouse constitutes probable cause.
127. Britt, 58 Cal. 2d at 472, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
128. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
129. [d. at 535-37. U[T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." [d. at 536-37. U[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss2/2

26

Collier: Restricting Sexual Conduct

1985]

RESTRICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT

327

that routine housing code inspections were reasonable when initiated pursuant to a warrant, even without the traditional probable cause requirement of specific knowledge of the conditions
inside the particular dwelling. I30 Three factors were stressed in
coming to this conclusion: (1) a history of acceptance and acquiescence to the inspections, a fact not present in the bathhouse
setting; (2) the public interest in abating dangerous conditions
and the inability or any other canvassing technique to achieve
acceptable results; and (3) the limited invasion of housing inspections on personal privacy.I31
For searches into private rooms to be effective in discovering "unsafe" sexual conduct, unannounced entry would seem to
be required. No other canvassing technique would be as effective. But as long as there are private rooms in which to have sex,
no canvassing technique will be very effective.
The nature of the search involved in bathhouses is very personal and frequent. 132 The intrusion into sexual privacy weighs
heavily in favor of a more stringent reasonableness requirement
than that required for housing code searches. Although the
countervailing state of interest is very strong, it is not demonstrably stronger than its interest in safe housing articulated in
Camara. Random searches not based on articulable facts intrude
on the privacy of patrons who pose no danger of spreading
AIDS, as well as the privacy of those who do. The frequency and
personal nature of random bathhouse cubicle searches not based
on articulable facts, and the lack of historical acceptance of the
practice, imposes too great an intrusion on privacy to justify the
state's goal of preventing the spread of the disease by methods
of questionable effectiveness. Under the Camara test, a more
stringent reasonableness requirement, based on specific facts of
suspected unsafe sex I33 should be required. A reasonabl~ suspiinterest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." [d. at 539.
130. [d. at 538,
131. [d. at 537.
132. Employees must patrol every 20 minutes in San Francisco v. Owen. See supra
note 41.
133. The fact of entering a private room alone should not be used to establish reasonable suspicion. To deduce reasonable suspicion from an individual's exercise of his
legitimate privacy right without more creates a vacuous reasonableness requirement. An
act creating a reasonable suspicion is required.
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cion standard achieves the appropriate balance.
In San Francisco v. Owen,134 the court faced the issue of a
fourth amendment right to privacy in the rented rooms of a
bathhouse. Its response was to order the doors removed from all
private rooms available to patrons, turning them into common
areas which can be patroled by employees. l3CI Since the order
was part of a preliminary injunction issued without opinion,
there is no clue as to what authority the court used to base its
decision. It appears that the court erred in ordering removal of
the doors.
The court has eliminated the fourth amendment protections
of the patrons by forbidding their privacy expectations. The
fourth amendment applies only when the individual has a justifiable expectation of privacy.136 The state may not avoid the
strictures of the amendment by ordering the elimination of the
environment which creates the expectation of privacy. To do so
emasculates the amendment and deprives itlof all meaning. The
private rooms are rented by the patrons specifically for the purpose of affording themselves a private environment under their
own control.137 If a person has a protected privacy expectation in
the toilet stall of a public restroom,138 he should have it in a
rented room in a bathhouse. The court's decision to remove that
134. No. 830-321 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. Cal. Nov. 28, 1984) (order granting preliminary injunction).
135. See supra note 41.
136. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. at 353.
137. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
105 (1980).
Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his
friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in
the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could
exclude others from it. Likewise in Katz, the defendant occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude
all others and paid the toll, which "entitled [him] to assume
the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be
broadcast to the world." (389 U. S. at 352). Katz and Jones
could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the
subject of the search and seizure each sought to contest.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149. "Nor did petitioner have any right to exclude other persons from
access to Cox's purse." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 105.
138. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851, 374 P.2d
817, 819.
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expectation of privacy and thereby avoid the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment is unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a direct conflict between the right to privacy for
gay sexual intercourse and the need to protect the public health
from the spread of AIDS. This conflict is not unresolvable. The
goals of the gay man and the public are not antagonistic, and a
sensitive balancing of the competing interests involved could result in a solution benefiting everyone.
Given the traditionally strong position of the state when it
asserts interests in protecting the spread of communicable disease and the weak position of adult consensual same-sex sexual
intercourse among the field of privacy rights, courts will likely
uphold statutes restricting gay sex in bathhouses. But deference
to state orders restricting sexual intercourse will not result in a
solution to the problem. The evidence that AIDS spreads more
rapidly in bathhouses than in other environments is inconclusive. Closing them or limiting the sexual activity inside without
proof of the danger they pose may give the public, gay and
straight, a false sense that the problem has been solved, if in fact
it has not. Deferential treatment under a rational basis standard
of scrutiny could result in further restrictions on gay rights in
other areas of the law, or an effort to recriminalize sodomy. Efforts to stop the spread of AIDS should not be a sledgehammer
to gay rights. The character of sexual intimacy underlying much
of the right of privacy is important and should be afforded protection as a fundamental right.
Review under strict scrutiny would allow the state to assert
its compelling interest in stopping the spread of AIDS while protecting the sexual privacy interests of the gay man. It would allow intrusions on· that interest only when they were necessary
and accomplished in the least restrictive manner. It should prevent the use of a bathhouse sex limitation as precedent for further restrictions on gay sexual activity.
Enforcement of any limitation on sexual activity within
bathhouses must be achieved through constitutional means. The
penumbras of privacy surround the fourth amendment as well.
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To ignore its strictures while treating sexual privacy as a fundamental right creates no more than a paper right without
protection.
The courts must be sensitive to the impact this conflict has
on the gay community. They need to avoid compounding the
hysteria, hatred and defensiveness which surrounds the issue. A
deeper awareness of the privacy issues involved will help courts
fashion remedies which are effective and necessary, not overly
intrusive or motivated by bias.
Stephen Collier*

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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